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I. INTRODUCTION
Given society’s overwhelming fascination with celebrities, it may be of 
little surprise to learn that celebrities continue to earn money after they have 
passed away.  However, it may astonish many how much celebrities actually do 
earn after their passing.  According to Forbes.com’s annual list, the “Top-Earning 
Dead Celebrities” for 2008 earned a combined total of $194 million over the year.1
While Elvis Presley topped the list for the second year in a row grossing $52 
million,2 industry analysts predicted that Marilyn Monroe3 and James Dean—who 
generated $6.5 million and $5 million, respectively—have true staying power due 
to their “iconic fame” that has carried each through the decades.4
Accordingly, a celebrity’s postmortem right of publicity—the right to control 
the commercial use of a deceased individual’s identity5—has emerged as a 
valuable source of income for a deceased celebrity’s estate, as well as a key issue 
in the legal arena.6 Although such right has not been implemented in federal law, 
a growing trend exists toward recognizing a postmortem right of publicity by 
statute or under common law.7 States that recognize such right have analogized 
the right of publicity to property rights, which are clearly devisable.8
Alternatively, some states have plainly rejected claims for a descendible right of 
publicity,9 finding the right more similar to a personal right that terminates upon 
the death of the individual.10
The conflict over the existence of a postmortem right of publicity may prove 
particularly troublesome for celebrities who split their time between California and 
New York—two states that rest on either side of the spectrum.  Since both 
California11 and New York12
1 Peter Hoy, Top-Earning Dead Celebrities, FORBES.COM, Oct. 27, 2008, http://www.forbes.com
/2008/10/27/dead-celebrity-earning-biz-media-deadcelebs08_cx_mn_de_1027celeb_land.html.
courts have held that the existence of a postmortem 
2 To put such a figure into perspective, it is necessary to note that Elvis Presley’s earnings in 2008 
outweighed some of the music industry’s current most popular living acts: Justin Timberlake grossed 
$44 million and Madonna produced $40 million in 2008.  Id.
3 The year 2008 serves as Marilyn Monroe’s eighth year in a row on the list.  Id.
4
Id.
5
See J. Thomas McCarthy, The Human Persona as Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity,
19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 130 (1995).
6 Kathy Heller, Deciding Who Cashes in on the Deceased Celebrity Business, 11 CHAP. L. REV.
545, 545 (2008).
7
See Rosenthal, infra note 85 and accompanying text.
8 Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is There 
Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125, 1127 (1980).
9
See Rosenthal, infra note 86 and accompanying text.
10 Felcher & Rubin, supra note 8, at 1127.
11
See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1147–49 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that heirs 
of Princess Diana had no right to sue for a violation of California’s postmortem publicity statute 
because Princess Diana was domiciled in England at the time of her death and England did not 
recognize a right of publicity, not to mention a postmortem right).
12
See Se. Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence, 489 N.E.2d 744 (N.Y. 1985).  It is important to note that not all 
states follow the “domicile rule.”  Edward H. Rosenthal, Rights of Publicity and Entertainment 
Licensing, in UNDERSTANDING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSE 235, 246 (Practising Law 
Institute ed. 2007).  For example, statutes enacted in Nevada and Indiana explicitly state that the rule is 
not applicable.  Id. However, under prevailing conflict of law provisions implemented in most states, 
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right of publicity depends on the domicile of the celebrity at the time of his or her 
death, a determination as to which state law applies is required in order to discover 
who is entitled to the deceased celebrity’s estate and future earnings.  As New 
York currently does not recognize a postmortem right of publicity,13 the recent 
rulings of the United States District Court for the Central District of California in 
granting a devisable right of publicity highlight the belief that California may be 
the better place for celebrities to both live and die.14
In Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., the court 
addressed the long-running legal battle—waged in Indiana, New York, and 
California—between the heirs of Marilyn Monroe and the estates of photographers 
who own photographs of the iconic actress.15  At issue is the right of publicity to 
control how images of Monroe are used commercially in advertisements or on 
merchandise.16 During her life, Monroe transferred her rights in such photographs 
to the photographers who captured the images.17  However, when Monroe died in 
August 1962, while she did not expressly bequeath a right of publicity—since such 
right had not yet been recognized—to her estate, she did include a residual clause 
in her will.18 Courts in both the Central District of California and the Southern 
District of New York granted summary judgment for the photographers’ estates, 
concluding that under both California and New York laws, Monroe lacked the 
testamentary capacity to devise the statutorily-created right of publicity that failed 
to come into existence until after her death.19  Applying the principles of property 
law, the courts reasoned that only property owned by the testator at the time of his 
or her death can be devised by will.20
However, immediately after the decisions were issued, the California State 
Legislature passed Senate Bill 771 (“SB 771”)21 “to abrogate the court’s ruling and 
clarify the meaning of California’s right of publicity statute”22 under California 
Civil Code section 3344.1.23 In response to the passage of SB 771, Monroe’s
estate filed a motion for reconsideration in the Central District of California.24
the existence of a postmortem right of publicity is determined by the law of the estate’s domicile.  Id.
Alternatively, other states have opted to apply the law of the state with the greatest interest in the issue.  
Id. at 247.
Relying on the legislative history and intent of SB 771 and section 3344.1, the 
court held that the right of publicity is freely transferable or descendible and was 
13
See infra Part II.C.
14
See Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. CV 05-02200 MMM (MCx), 
2008 WL 655604, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008) (on motion for reconsideration); Milton H. Greene 
Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
15
Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *1.
16
Id.
17 Heller, supra note 6, at 556.
18
See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
19
Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *1, *3 n.14 (citing Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG 
Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
20
Id.
21
See infra Part III.D.
22
Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *2.
23 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 1997); see infra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
24
Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *2.
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held by Monroe at the time of her death.25 Accordingly, Monroe’s estate 
possessed standing to assert Monroe’s postmortem right of publicity claims under 
California law, and the previous summary judgment rulings were vacated.26
However, the court ultimately decided that Monroe was domiciled in New York at 
the time of her death, requiring the law of New York—a state, unlike California, 
that recognizes neither a statutory nor common law descendible, postmortem right 
of publicity—to apply, resulting in a major win for the photographers’ estates.27
The choice of law dichotomy illustrated in Milton foreshadows the likelihood 
of future lawsuits filed in order to determine who can capitalize on a deceased 
celebrity’s earnings that continue after his or her death.  For a celebrity who 
“lived” both in California and New York, it is probable that the celebrity’s estate 
will argue that he or she was domiciled in California in order to benefit from the 
state’s recognition of the postmortem right of publicity while other unauthorized 
entities interested in exploiting the celebrity’s identity will claim that he or she was 
domiciled in New York to ensure that the right of publicity cannot be devised.  In a 
society where celebrities’ fortunes continue to grow exponentially after their 
deaths, it is alarming that a celebrity’s ability to control his or her identity post 
death is ultimately decided according to a court’s finding of his or her domicile.  
Moreover, as the right of publicity was primarily designed to meet celebrities’
needs, it seems anomalous that the two states where most celebrities live have such 
conflicting laws—making the potential for forum-shopping a likely reality.
This case note discusses the origins, reasoning, and impact of the Milton
decision.  It argues that New York should adopt a similar right of publicity statute 
as that found in California in order to ensure the protection of a celebrity’s identity 
post death and establish a uniform policy for two states that consistently cater to 
celebrities.  Part II summarizes the general legal principles concerning the right of 
publicity, the evolution of the right of publicity in both California and New York, 
and the current issues surrounding the trend toward implementing a postmortem 
right of publicity.28 Part III describes the relevant facts of the two leading Marilyn 
Monroe disputes: Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc. and 
Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., as well as the procedural 
developments concerning the right of publicity.29 Part IV examines the analysis of 
the court’s opinion in Milton.30 Part V presents the future implications of the 
Milton decision.31 The case note is concluded in Part VI.32
25
Id. at *3–4, *13–14.
26
Id. at *14.
27
Id. at *15.
28
See infra Part II.
29
See infra Part III.
30
See infra Part IV.
31
See infra Part V.
32
See infra Part VI.
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II. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A. The Evolution of the Right of Publicity in the United States
The right of publicity encompasses the intangible right of an individual—
primarily a public figure or a celebrity—to control the commercial value and 
exploitation of his or her name, picture, likeness, or voice and to prevent others 
from unfairly exploiting this value through advertising or trade purposes for 
commercial benefit.33  While the right of publicity is largely developed by federal 
courts, such right is truly governed by state law, granting each state the freedom to 
dictate the future of the right.34
Historically, the right of publicity emerged from the right of privacy.35
During the 1950s, the development of new publishing technologies enabled 
marketers to exploit celebrities’ identities for profit.36 With the rapid increase of 
mass-marketing schemes, it became apparent to many—especially celebrities—
that individuals possess an interest in their personal identities that was not 
“adequately protected by the tort of invasion of privacy.”37  Thus, a claim for the 
right of publicity is more generally recognized as a form of intellectual property, 
where an individual seeks “the right to control and profit from the use of [his or 
her]” identity and not as a “right to be left alone.”38
While the right of publicity had been discussed in a variety of forms, the 
33
See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 239; Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 
866 (2d Cir. 1953); David Westfall & David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71 (2005).  It is important to note that the right of publicity is possessed by all 
individuals—both celebrities and non-celebrities.  McCarthy, supra note 5, at 134.  However, as 
expected, the majority of case law concerns celebrities since only a celebrity’s right of publicity 
commands sufficient value to justify expensive litigation and appeals.  Id. The right of publicity is 
limited only to the protection of human beings.  Id.  Accordingly, corporations, partnerships, and 
institutions cannot claim infringement of their right to publicity.  Id.
34 Jonathan L. Kranz, Sharing the Spotlight: Equitable Distribution of the Right of Publicity, 13 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 917, 934–35 (1995).
35 McCarthy, supra note 5, at 134.  The right of publicity is also viewed as similar to forms of 
intellectual property, including trademark and copyright.  Id.
36 Jennifer L. Carpenter, Internet Publication: The Case for an Expanded Right of Publicity for 
Non-Celebrities, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, para. 7 (2001), available at http://www.vjolt.net/vol6/issue1/
v6i1a03-Carpenter.html.
37
Id. Although celebrities aimed to recover damages for the unauthorized use of their images 
under the invasion of privacy tort, they believed that such form of damages did not adequately remedy 
the source of misappropriation.  Id.  However, many courts reasoned that celebrities assumed the risk of 
misappropriation and exploitation due to the very nature of their occupation.  Id.  Moreover, since 
courts were required to decide such issues based on the tort of invasion of privacy, celebrity plaintiffs 
were forced to show emotional harm and damage to their character of reputation as a result of the 
exploitation of their identity—concerns that were often irrelevant to the celebrities.  Id.  Rather, 
celebrities sought to control and profit from the use of their identity, not to prevent any such publication 
in its entirety.  Id.
38 James M. Chadwick & Roxana Vatanparast, The Copyright Act’s Preemption of Right of 
Publicity Claims, 25 COMM. LAW. 3, 3 (2008). As an increasing number of celebrities filed suit to 
recover for misappropriation of their identities, it became apparent “that privacy law was inadequate to 
accommodate ‘uncompensated, rather than unwelcome, publicity.’”  Tara B. Mulrooney, Note, A 
Critical Examination of New York’s Right of Publicity Claim, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1139, 1142 (2000)
(quoting Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandising of 
Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV. 603, 622 (1984)).
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term was officially coined in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 
Inc.39 In Haelan, a chewing-gum company that had contracted with a baseball 
player for the exclusive right to use the player’s photograph in connection with the 
sale of gum filed suit against a competitor who produced and sold merchandise 
using the player’s photograph.40  The defendant company argued that the plaintiff 
could not sue based on the claim of invasion of privacy because such right was 
personal and thus not assignable.41 However, the court held that “in addition to 
and independent of [the] right of privacy . . . a[n] [individual] has a right in the 
publicity value of his [or her] photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive 
privilege of publishing [the] picture.”42 Judge Frank reasoned that a right of 
publicity was essential in ensuring that “prominent persons”—namely, celebrities 
and athletes—received adequate compensation for the use of their identity for 
commercial purposes.43 Moreover, the court concluded that such right could be 
licensed or assigned, and the licensee or assignee was entitled to enforce it against 
third parties.44
Since the right of publicity’s inception in Haelan, the right has been widely 
embraced by both courts and state legislatures.45 More than half of all states 
recognize a right of publicity in some legal capacity—either through common 
law46 or state legislation.47 Many states that have enacted their own laws 
explicitly recognize a right to publicity, while others have enacted broad statutes 
concerning privacy48 and unfair competition49
39
See 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953); Westfall & Landau, supra note 33, at 76.  Two lines of 
cases evolved prior to Haelan that expressed justifications for the right of publicity.  Westfall & 
Landau, supra note 33, at 76.  The older line of cases was based on the natural copyright theory that 
every person is entitled to a “natural property right in his or her name or likeness.”  Id. The more recent 
line of cases stressed the idea that appropriation of an individual’s identity for profit constituted a 
violation of his or her right of privacy.  Id.
that encompass unauthorized 
40
Haelan, 202 F.2d at 867.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 868.  Using such language, Judge Frank clearly believed that he was creating an 
“independent” right that was completely separate from that of the existing right of privacy.  Westfall & 
Landau, supra note 33, at 77.
43
Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868.  Judge Frank further concluded that such right of publicity would 
essentially be powerless unless it could guarantee an exclusive grant that barred competing advertisers 
from using a celebrity’s image.  Id.
44 Kranz, supra note 34, at 951.  It is important to note that Judge Frank “did not go so far as to 
explicitly label the right of publicity as a ‘property right’ for fear of the effect on unsettled issues 
regarding inheritance, tax, and divorce.”  Id.
45 Carpenter, supra note 36.
46
Id. States with common-law sources for the right of publicity include Alabama, Arizona, 
Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, and Oregon.  
Thomas F. Zuber, Everlasting Fame: Recent Legislation has Clarified the Descendible Right of 
Publicity for Personalities Who Died Prior to 1985, L.A. LAWYER., May 2009, at 29, 31, 34 n.62; see 
also Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 245–46.
47 Carpenter, supra note 36.  States that currently recognize the right to publicity in their state 
statutes include California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington.  Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 245–
46.
48
See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 239. The right of publicity is included in a group of torts that 
generally comprise the right of privacy: intrusion, false light, unreasonable publicity, and appropriation 
of name or likeness.  Id.  Under this formulation, the invasion of the right of publicity is most similar to 
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commercial exploitation of an individual.  Moreover, as new media technologies 
continue to develop and celebrities discover their images published in novel and 
creative ways, the right of publicity has expanded to protect more aspects of their 
commercial identities, including a celebrity’s name, picture, likeness, and voice.50
B. The Right of Publicity in California
As so many celebrities call California home, the state has consistently served 
as an advocate of the right of publicity.51 While the state is not the most liberal in 
its protection of an individual’s right of publicity, its statutes are viewed as strong 
defenders of celebrity rights.52
In 1971, the California State Legislature created a statutory right of 
publicity—available to all living personalities, regardless of celebrity status—by 
enacting California Civil Code section 3344.53 The statute, which terminated 
publicity rights upon an individual’s death, was implemented to protect an 
individual’s economic interest by banning the knowing use of the name, likeness, 
voice, and image of an individual without his or her permission.54
In 1979, the California Supreme Court recognized a common law right of 
the unauthorized appropriation of one’s name or likeness.  Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§§ 652A-I (1977).
49 Carpenter, supra note 36.  Under the law of unfair competition, actions for the tort of 
misappropriation or for a wrongful attempt to “pass off” the product as endorsed or produced by the 
individual aid in protecting the right of publicity.  See id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (“One who appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using 
without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject 
to liability . . . .”).
50 Carpenter, supra note 36. For example, in Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463–64 (9th 
Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit held that an identifiable voice, like a name or likeness, constitutes part of a 
celebrity’s commercial identity and is thus protected by the right of publicity.  However, not all states 
have recognized a claim for use of a sound alike under statutory law.  See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 
251–53.
51 Eric Farber, U-LA-LA, What’s Happened to Our California Right of Publicity?, 11 CHAP. L.
REV. 449, 449 (2008).
52
Id. Although California has a vested interest in the right of publicity—in large part due to the 
considerable number of celebrities that reside in the state—Indiana and Tennessee have enacted even 
stronger statutes to protect a celebrity’s right of publicity. Id. at 463 n.6; see also Zuber, supra note 46,
at 31.  The justification for such protective statutes lies in the fact that Indiana serves as the home to 
CMG Worldwide—a company that represents the estates of deceased celebrities in the sports, 
entertainment, and musical fields, including Babe Ruth, Marilyn Monroe, and James Dean—whereas 
Tennessee boasts the reputation as the home of Elvis Presley.  Id.; CMG Worldwide, Overview, 
http://www.cmgworldwide.com/corporate/overview.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
53 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997), amended by CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 1997); see 
Heller, supra note 6, at 549; Farber, supra note 51, at 449.
54 § 3344.  Section 3344(a) provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who knowingly uses another’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or 
likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for 
purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, 
merchandise, goods or services, without such person’s prior consent, or, in the 
case of a minor, the prior consent of his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable 
for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.
§ 3344(a).  The California State Legislature also created an exemption for the “use of a name, voice, 
signature, photograph, or likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or 
account, or any political campaign.”  § 3344(d).
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publicity55 in the companion cases Lugosi v. Universal Pictures56 and Guglielmi v. 
Spelling-Goldberg Productions.57 In Lugosi, Bela Lugosi’s heirs sued to enjoin 
and recover profits from Universal Pictures (“Universal”) for licensing Lugosi’s
name and image on merchandise reprising Lugosi’s title role in the 1930 film 
“Dracula. “58 The California Supreme Court faced the issue as to whether 
Lugosi’s film contracts with Universal included a grant of merchandising rights in 
his portrayal of Count Dracula and the descendibility of any such rights.59  While 
the court recognized the presence of a right of publicity, the court concluded that 
publicity rights were not descendible, reasoning that the “right to exploit name and 
likeness is personal to the artist and must be exercised, if at all, by him during his 
lifetime.”60 Four days later, in Guglielmi, the California Supreme Court again 
concluded that the right of publicity does not survive a person’s death.61 In this 
case, Rudolph Valentino’s heir filed suit claiming that Spelling-Goldberg 
Productions misappropriated Valentino’s right of publicity of which the heir 
currently owned.62  The court, citing Lugosi as controlling, held that “the right of 
publicity protects against the unauthorized use of one’s name, likeness, or 
personality, but that the right is not descendible and expires upon the death of the 
person so protected.”63  However, as time would later tell, the issue as to whether 
the right of publicity is descendible in the state of California would again be 
addressed and answered in the affirmative.64
55 Under California’s common law right of publicity, a cause of action for appropriation of name or 
likeness may be pleaded by alleging (1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the 
appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) 
the lack of consent; and (4) the resulting injury.  See Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 
347 (Ct. App. 1983) (allowing actor Clint Eastwood to state a right of publicity cause of action against 
The National Enquirer magazine).
56
See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 425 (Cal. 1979).
57
See Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 454 (Cal. 1979).
58
Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 427.  Lugosi’s heirs were entitled to a share of the profits from Universal’s 
licensing of Lugosi’s image as the character Count Dracula.  Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 431.  Applying the aforementioned reasoning, the court concluded that after Lugosi’s 
death, his name, image, and likeness were in the public domain, allowing anyone to exploit them for a 
“legitimate commercial purpose.”  Id. at 430.  Thus, while the court reaffirmed the belief that the right 
of publicity can be exploited during the course of a celebrity’s lifetime, it maintained that a celebrity’s 
heirs cannot enforce such right or reap any financial benefit from the right unless the celebrity “sold [his 
or her right of publicity] for installment payments and/or royalties due after his [or her] death, in which 
. . . such payments and/or royalties would . . . be a part of his [or her] estate.”  Id. at 429; see Amy D. 
Hogue & Michael B. Garfinkel, The Right of Publicity: Does It Survive Death and Abandonment?, 30 
TORT & INS. L.J. 663, 668 (1995). The court also commented on the need for section 3344 to fill “a gap 
which exists in the common law tort of invasion of privacy in the state of California.”  Lugosi, 603 P.2d 
at 443 (quoting Letter from John Vasconcellos, Cal. State Assembly, to Ronald Reagan, Governor, Cal. 
(Nov. 10, 1971)).  The Lugosi court’s logic was also applied by the Second Circuit in Groucho Marx 
Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 318 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that the descendibility 
of the Marx Brothers’ rights of publicity was governed by California law and thus such rights did not 
survive death).
61
Guglielmi, 603 P.2d 454, 455 (Cal. 1979).
62
Id. at 454.
63
Id.
64
See infra notes 88–94 and accompanying text.
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C. The Right of Publicity in New York
Although New York was an early leader in establishing publicity rights, the 
state’s advancement of the right has rapidly declined and is now confined within 
the restrictions of a narrowly defined privacy statute.65 Before the historical 
Haelan case, New York paved the way for the right of publicity by enacting New 
York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51 in order to govern privacy law in the 
state of New York.66 The statutes prohibit the use of the name, portrait, or picture 
of any living person without prior consent for “advertising purposes” or “for the 
purposes of trade.”67
After Haelan established the belief that a common law right of publicity 
existed in New York during the 1950s,68 the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York decided Price v. Hal Roach Studios and confirmed 
the existence of such common law right.69 Moreover, the Price court reasoned that 
the right of publicity qualified as a property right and, as such, was legally distinct 
from the right of privacy.70
However, New York’s recognition of a separate right of publicity ended in 
65
See John C. Fuller, Note, Like a Candle in the Wind: Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. CMG 
Worldwide, Inc. and the Flickering Recognition of Marilyn Monroe’s Right of Publicity in New York,
15 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 299, 312 (2008).
66 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 1992); see Fuller, supra note 65, at 312; Mark A. 
Roesler, Celebrity Licensing, in THE LICENSING DESKBOOK 1, 4 (Gregory J. Battersby & Charles W. 
Grimes eds., 1999), available at http://www.markroesler.com/pdf/publishedworks/celebritylicensing.
pdf.
67 §§ 50–51.  Section 50 provides:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the 
purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without 
having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or 
her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
§ 50.  Section 51 provides remedies for a violation of section 50: 
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for  
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first 
obtained . . . may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court of this state 
against the person, firm or corporation so using his name, portrait or picture, to 
prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for 
any injuries sustained by reason of such use and if the defendant shall have 
knowingly used such  person’s  name, portrait or picture in such manner as is 
forbidden or declared to be unlawful . . . the  jury . . . may award exemplary 
damages.
§ 51.
68
See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
69
See 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).  In the case, two plaintiffs, widows of comedians, sued a 
film studio for which their late husbands had worked claiming that the studio used their husbands’ 
names and likeness without prior authorization.  Id. at 837–38; see Fuller, supra note 65, at 324–25.
70
Price, 400 F. Supp. at 843.  The court explained that the right of privacy and the right of 
publicity differ greatly in theory and scope in that the right of privacy protects an individual “from 
intrusion upon [his or her] privacy” whereas the right of publicity protects an individual “from 
appropriation of some element of [his or her] personality for commercial exploitation.”  Id. The court 
further elaborated by stating that New York’s statutory laws (sections 50 and 51) were created based on 
privacy law while the common law right of publicity finds its root in property law.  Id. Lastly, as 
discussed later in this note, the court rationalized that the right of publicity, as a property right with a 
“purely commercial nature,” is descendible.  Id. at 844.
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1984 when the New York Court of Appeals decided Stefano v. News Group 
Publications.71 The court of appeals repudiated the belief that a separate right of 
publicity existed and held that such right is “encompassed under the Civil Rights 
Law as an aspect of the right of privacy.”72 Moreover, the court officially rejected 
the belief that the right of privacy is limited to situations where “the defendant’s
conduct has caused distress to a person who wishes to lead a private life free of all 
commercial publicity”73 and confirmed that the statutes apply “to any use of a 
person’s picture or portrait for advertising or trade purposes” without prior 
authorization.74 The Second Circuit soon adopted New York’s interpretation of 
the right of publicity in Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc.75 Relying on the decision set 
forth in Stefano, the Second Circuit affirmed that “the state statutory provisions 
concerning a right of publicity are exclusive,” and thus the Civil Rights Law 
clearly “preempts any common law right of publicity action.”76
D. An Emerging Trend: The Postmortem Right of Publicity
Although the right of publicity has clearly been established as enforceable 
during an individual’s lifetime, states differ greatly over whether the right is 
descendible.77 In finding a solution to this discrepancy, many courts have 
determined whether the right of publicity should be descendible by applying 
analogies to the issue.78 When the right of publicity was initially introduced, it 
was analogized to the right of privacy.79
71 474 N.E.2d 580, 583–84 (N.Y. 1984).  In the case, a model claimed that an advertiser used a 
picture of him without his consent in violation of section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law and the 
common law right of publicity.  Id. at 581.
In accordance with this view, since the 
72 Id. at 584.
73
Id. The court rejected past courts’ notion that the statutory right to privacy was limited to cases 
for which it was originally enacted—namely, celebrities’ wish to be left alone—and thus “would not 
preclude the recognition in [New York] of a common-law ‘right of publicity.’”  Id.
74
Id. The court clearly set out the circumstances that would allow a claim under the New York 
Civil Rights Law statutes (and not the now-eliminated independent common -law right of publicity): 
“where the written consent to use the plaintiff’s name or picture for advertising or trade purposes has 
expired or the defendant has otherwise exceeded the limitations of the consent.”  Id. While the court 
recognized that such violated right may “more accurately be described as a right of publicity,” the court 
reasoned that the right of publicity falls under the right of privacy, which is “exclusively statutory” in 
the state of New York, thus eliminating any cause of action under an “independent common-law right 
of publicity.”  Id.
75 894 F.2d 579, 586 (2d Cir. 1990).  In the case, the heirs of George “Babe” Ruth sued the 
producers of a calendar that contained the name and images of Ruth.  Id. at 581; see Fuller, supra note 
65, at 328–29.
76
Pirone, 894 F.2d at 585–86 (citing Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 584).
77
See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 8, at 1125 (“The descendibility of publicity rights has proved to 
be a troublesome issue, because of both the nature of the claims presented and the distinctions to be 
made in separating the private and the public domains.”); see also Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 245–47.
78 Felcher & Rubin, supra note 8, at 1127.  The author discusses both the advantages and 
disadvantages of adopting an analogical approach.  An advantage of such process is that it allows 
previously developed logic and conclusions to bear on future decisions concerning the right of 
publicity.  Id. Alternatively, while such approach may enable greater predictability in the courtroom, 
analogies tend to force a formally-established line of reasoning on every issue encountered by right of 
publicity cases.  Id. at 1127–28.
79
Id. at 1127; see McCarthy, supra note 5, at 134.
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right of privacy was established as a personal right that terminated with the death 
of the individual claiming it, such parallel led to the conclusion that the right of 
publicity was also indivisible.80
Recently, however, a growing trend has emerged that analogizes the right of 
publicity to property rights.81 Courts and commentators have justified this 
comparison based on the joint purpose of publicity rights: to protect an individual 
against misappropriation for commercial value of his or her name or likeness and 
to grant the individual exclusive control over his or her name or likeness.82
Accordingly, damages in right of publicity cases are measured by “the commercial 
injury to the business value of personal identity.”83  Since most forms of property 
are transferable at death, this line of reasoning allows for the conclusion that an 
individual’s property right in his or her name or likeness is also devisable.84 While 
only a few states initially recognized a postmortem right of publicity, many states 
have come to recognize such right—by explicit statute or under common law85—
while others have clearly rejected a claim for the right.86 As the debate over 
postmortem rights of publicity continues, two states with close ties have taken 
opposing stances: California and New York.87
In response to the Lugosi and Guglielmi courts’ rulings that rights of 
publicity are not descendible,88
80 Felcher & Rubin, supra note 8, at 1127.  Accordingly, the right of privacy is understandably 
terminated at death due to its concern for the “personal sensibilities of an individual.”  Id. at 1128.  
Applying this reasoning, a celebrity’s heirs would be prevented from claiming a violation of a right of 
publicity regarding the deceased celebrity.  Id. at 1127.
the California State Legislature vested a right of 
81
Id.; see also Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 245–46.
82 Felcher & Rubin, supra note 8, at 1127. The author further contrasts the interest protected by 
the right of publicity—economic interest that encourages “individual enterprise and creativity by 
allowing people to profit from their own efforts”—to the interest satisfied by the right of privacy—”an 
individual’s desire to avoid unwanted public exposure.”  Id. at 1128.
83 Roesler, supra note 66, at 4.
84
Id. Infringement of an individual’s right of publicity is thus determined “by the fair market 
value of the plaintiff’s identity, the infringer’s profits, and damage to the licensing opportunities for the 
plaintiff’s identity.”  Id.  Alternatively, damages in privacy cases are measured according to the injured 
individual’s emotional distress.  Id. at 3–4.
85 Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 245–46.  States that have come to recognize a postmortem right of 
publicity include the following: California (seventy years after death, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 
1997)); Connecticut (recognized under common law); Florida (forty years after death if claimed by the 
spouse, issue, or bequest, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 2009)); Georgia (recognized under common 
law); Illinois (fifty years after death, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/1–1075/30 (West 2009)); 
Indiana (one hundred years after death, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1 to -20 (West 2009)); Kentucky 
(fifty years after death, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (West 2009)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 
20-202 (2009)); Nevada (fifty years after death, NEV. REV. STAT. § 597.790 (2009)); New Jersey 
(recognized under common law); Ohio (sixty years after death, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.02 (West 
2009)); Oklahoma (one hundred years after death, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1448 (West 2007)); 
Tennessee (ten years after death with extension available, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1102 to -07 
(West 2009)); Texas (fifty years after death, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 26.001-.012 (Vernon 2009)); 
Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-1 to -6 (West 2008)); Virginia (twenty years after death, VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-40 (West 2009)); Washington (ten years after death with exception for persons whose 
identity has “commercial value,” WASH. REV. CODE §§ 63.60.010-040 (2009)).  Rosenthal, supra note 
12, at 245–46.
86 Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 246; see also Zuber, supra note 46, at 31 & 34 n.61.
87
See infra notes 88–97 and accompanying text.
88 Heller, supra note 6, at 549.  The California State Legislature’s decision was also prompted 
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publicity in celebrities’ heirs by enacting California Civil Code section 990 in 
1985.89 The new statute allowed a celebrity’s right of publicity to pass to his or 
her heirs, who then had the opportunity to prevent the unauthorized use of the 
celebrity’s name and likeness.90 In 1999, the California State Legislature amended 
section 990 and incorporated it into section 3344; consequently, section 990 
became section 3344.1.91 The amended statute grants the heirs and transferees the 
right to consent to the use of the “name, voice, signature, photograph, or 
likeness . . . or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising 
or selling” concerning the “deceased personality.”92  Under the statute, “deceased 
personality” is defined as an individual who died after 1935 and “whose name or 
personality had commercial value at the time of his [or her] death.”93 Essentially, 
the law created “property rights”—freely transferable by contract or testamentary 
documents—that extended for seventy years after the celebrity’s death.94
largely by the Screen Actors Guild, celebrities, and the heirs of deceased celebrities.  Id. Conversely, 
the legislation was opposed by the American Civil Liberties Union and various copyright holders—
including the Motion Picture Association of America, the Alliance of Motion Picture and Television 
Producers, CBS, and NBC.  Id. at 550.
89 CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West 2007) (current version at § 3344.1 (West 1997)); see Roesler, 
supra note 66, at 5.
90 Roesler, supra note 66, at 5.  Section 990 prevented unauthorized use of the celebrity’s persona 
for a period of fifty years.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West 2007). However, this term was later extended 
to seventy years.  See § 3344.1.
91 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 1997).
92
Id.  Section 3344.1(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who uses a deceased personality’s name, voice, signature, 
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, 
or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, 
merchandise, goods, or services, without prior consent from the person or 
persons specified in subdivision (c), shall be liable for any damages sustained by 
the person or persons injured as a result thereof.
§ 3344.1(a).
93 Heller, supra note 6, at 550.
94
Id.; Roesler, supra note 66, at 5.  Section 3344.1(b) provides: 
The rights recognized under this section are property rights, freely transferable or 
descendible, in whole or in part, by contract or by means of any trust or any other 
testamentary documents, whether the transfer occurs before the death of the 
deceased personality, by the deceased personality or his or her transferees, or, 
after the death of the deceased personality, by the person or persons in whom the 
rights vest under this section or the transferees of that person or person.
§ 3344.1(b). Section 3344.1(c) and (d) also clarified the order in which surviving heirs inherited the 
deceased personality’s rights.  Section 3344.1(c) provides: 
The consent required by this section shall be exercisable by the person or persons 
to whom the right of consent, or portion thereof, has been transferred in 
accordance with subdivision (b), or if no transfer has occurred, then by the person 
or persons to whom the right of consent, or portion thereof, has passed in 
accordance with subdivision (d).
§ 3344.1(c).  Section 3344.1(d) provides:
Subject to subdivisions (b) and (c), after the death of any person, the rights under 
this section shall belong to the following person or persons and may be exercised, 
on behalf of and for the benefit of all of those persons, by those persons who, in 
the aggregate, are entitled to more than a one-half interest in the rights: [the 
surviving spouse and surviving children or grandchildren, or the surviving 
parents of the deceased personality].
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Alternatively, New York has elected to restrict the concept of publicity rights 
within the limits of the state’s privacy statute.95 Since the right of privacy under 
the statute is recognized as purely personal, the right of publicity accordingly can 
only be enforced by the actual individual whose name or likeness has been 
misappropriated and cannot be transferred.96 Moreover, since the New York 
statute has been interpreted as “clearly limited” to living persons, the courts have 
concluded that no postmortem right of publicity exists in the state of New York.97
However, in the summer of 2008, for the second year in a row, New York 
lawmakers proposed two bills—Senate Bill 6005 and Assembly Bill 8836—to 
amend sections 50 and 51 to create a retroactive postmortem right of publicity for 
any deceased individual who died within seventy years prior to the enactment of 
the proposed law.98 Similar to California’s newly-amended right of publicity 
statute, the proposed New York legislation would create a postmortem right of 
publicity that is “deemed to vest retroactively to the deceased person before such 
person’s death,” enabling a transfer—including one by will—by the deceased 
person or his or her transferees to “occur before or at the time of death of the 
deceased person.”99 As expected, Monroe’s heirs, as well as various celebrities 
and deceased celebrities’ estates, have provided much support for the proposed 
legislation.100
III. MILTON H. GREENE ARCHIVES, INC. V. CMG WORLDWIDE, INC.: FACTS AND 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. The Marilyn Monroe Right of Publicity Debate
Marilyn Monroe’s image was captured by various great photographers 
throughout the course of her life, including Milton Greene, Tom Kelley, and Sam 
Shaw.101 Since Monroe transferred her rights to such photos to the photographers, 
the copyrights to the images currently belong to the photographers’ estates and are 
licensed to vendors for further commercial use.102
§ 3344.1(d).
However, when Monroe died in 
95 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 1992); see Stephano v. News Group Publ’ns, Inc.,
474 N.E.2d 580, 583–84 (1984); Mulrooney, supra note 38, at 1152.
96 Mulrooney, supra note 38, at 1153.
97 Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 585 (2d Cir. 1990); see James v. Delilah Films, Inc., 
544 N.Y.S.2d 447, 451 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (holding that the successors-in-interest do not have a cause 
of action under New York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51 since the statutory rights created by the 
law “do not survive death”).
98 Andrew J. Thomas, Legislators to Celebrities: There’s No Such Thing As Too Much (Right of) 
Publicity, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP ENT. ADVISORY BULL., Aug. 27, 2008, http://www.dwt.com/
practc/entertain/bulletins/08-08_RightofPublicity.htm#_ftn5.
99
Id.
100
Id.  Living celebrities who support the bills include actors Al Pacino, Martin Sheen, and Sophia 
Loren and singers Liza Minnelli and Yoko Ono.  Id.  Moreover, the estates of Babe Ruth, Jackie 
Robinson, and Mickey Mantle have pushed for the bills’ enactment.  Id.
101 Heller, supra note 6, at 556.
102
Id.
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August 1962,103 she left a will, which did not expressly bequeath a right of 
publicity but did include a residual clause leaving the “entire remaining balance”
of her estate to Lee Strasberg, Monroe’s acting coach.104 Lee Strasberg later 
married Anna Strasberg, who became the sole beneficiary under Lee Strasberg’s
will when he died and was named the administratrix of Monroe’s estate.105 In
2001, Anna Strasberg was authorized to close Monroe’s estate and transfer the 
residuary assets to Marilyn Monroe, LLC (“MMLLC”), a Delaware company 
established by Anna Strasberg to control the intellectual property assets of the 
residuary beneficiaries of Monroe’s will.106 Accordingly, MMLLC and its 
licensing agent, CMG Worldwide, Inc. (“CMG”), have claimed the postmortem 
right of publicity to Monroe’s copyrighted images and have consistently asserted 
that right in their dealings with venues granted licenses by the photographers’
estates.107
B. New York’s Ruling on Monroe’s Right of Publicity
In 2005, MMLLC and CMG filed suit against the Shaw Family Archives, 
Ltd. (“SFA”)108 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Indiana, claiming SFA (representing photographers, as well as their estates and 
agents) violated Monroe’s right of publicity by using Monroe’s “name, image, and 
likeness for commercial purposes without consent.”109
103
Id.
Plaintiffs relied on 
Indiana’s Right of Publicity Act, which prohibits an individual from using 
another’s right of publicity for commercial purposes without the owner’s
104
Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, No. CV 05-02200 MMM (MCx), 2008 WL 
655604, at *13–14 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008).  The residual clause of Monroe’s will provided:
All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, of 
whatsoever nature and wheresoever situate, of which I shall die seized or 
possessed or to which I shall be in any way entitled, or over which I shall possess 
any power of appointment by Will at the time of my death, including any lapsed 
legacies, I give, devise and bequeath as follows: 
(a) To MAY REIS the sum of $40,000.00 or 25% of the total remainder of 
my estate, whichever shall be the lesser.
(b) To DR. MARIANNE KRIS 25% of the balance thereof, to be used by 
her as set forth in ARTICLE FIFTH (d) of this my Last Will and 
Testament.
(c) To LEE STRASBERG the entire remaining balance.
Id. at *14.
105 Heller, supra note 6, at 556.  The determination of Anna Strasberg as the administratrix of 
Monroe’s estate was settled in New York County Surrogate’s Court.  Id.
106 Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007).
107 Heller, supra note 6, at 557.
108
Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 310.  SFA is a company organized under New York 
law with its primary place of business in New York.  Id. at 312.  SFA claimed ownership of a series of 
photographs of Monroe as the heirs of photographer Sam Shaw.  Id. at 313.
109
Id. at 310.  The original dispute arose in the state of Indiana from the sale of a T-shirt that 
contained a picture of Monroe and the maintenance of a website by SFA that licensed images of 
Monroe for use on commercial products.  Id. at 313.
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consent.110 Prior to being served in the Indiana action, SFA filed a separate suit 
against MMLLC and CMG in the Southern District of New York “seeking a 
declaratory judgment on whether there is any postmortem right of privacy or 
publicity in the name, likeness, and image of Marilyn Monroe.”111 While the two 
cases were eventually consolidated in the Southern District of New York, the court 
determined that Indiana law continued to apply.112
The court granted SFA’s motion for summary judgment holding that 
regardless of Monroe’s domicile at the time of her death, “Monroe could not 
devise by will a property right she did not own at the time of her death in 1962.”113
The court based its ruling on three findings.114 First, the court confirmed that 
descendible postmortem rights of publicity were not recognized in California, 
Indiana, or New York at the time of Monroe’s death.115 Consequently, the court 
concluded that any right of publicity Monroe enjoyed during her lifetime was 
“extinguished at her death by operation of law.”116 Second, by examining the 
language of Monroe’s will, the court reasoned that Monroe did not intend to devise 
property she did not own at the time of her death—namely, a right of publicity—to 
her residual beneficiaries.117
110
Id.; see IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-1 (West 2009) (outlining Indiana publicity rights).
Moreover, the court found that even if Monroe’s
language in her will had demonstrated an intent to devise such property, the 
111
Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 310.
112
Id. at 311.  The court determined that since SFA was “amenable to jurisdiction in Indiana,” 
Indiana’s choice of law principles applied to the case.  Id. Accordingly, the court followed Indiana’s 
“first-to-file” rule, which gave priority to the Indiana lawsuit filed by MMLLC and CMG over the New 
York lawsuit later filed by SFA.  Id.
113
Id. at 314.
114
Id. at 314–20.
115
Id. at 314.  The court reached this holding by reviewing prior case law and each state’s relevant 
publicity statute.  Relying on Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1990), the court found 
that New York law’s privacy statute limited a right of publicity to living persons.  Shaw Family 
Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314.  The court then reviewed California Civil Code section 3344.1 and 
found that the state did not recognize a postmortem right of publicity until it passed its statute in 1984, 
twenty-two years after Monroe’s death.  Id.; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 1997).  While the 
court found that California recognized a common law right of publicity prior to 1984, the court 
maintained that such right was not divisible.  Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314.  Lastly, the 
court concluded that Indiana did not recognize a postmortem right of publicity until 1994 when it 
passed the Indiana Right of Publicity Act.  Id.; see IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1 to -20 (West 2009).
116
Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314.  The court then addressed MMLLC’s argument 
that although the right of publicity did not exist at the time of Monroe’s death, later statutes bequeathed 
such right to Monroe and to her heirs.  Id. at 314–17.  Applying Indiana law, which required that the 
law of the state in which the testator was domiciled at the time of his or her death apply, the court 
examined California and New York’s probate laws.  Id. (citing White v. United States, 511 F. Supp. 570 
(S.D. Ind. 1981)).  Although disputed issues of fact existed concerning the domicile of Monroe, the 
court found such dispute irrelevant since neither state “permitted a testator to dispose by will of 
property [he or] she does not own at the time of [his or] her death.”  Id. at 315.  Specifically, the court 
held that in New York State, property not owned by the testator at the time of his or her death cannot be 
disposed by will.  Id. (“A disposition by the testator of all his property passes all of the property he was 
entitled to dispose of at the time of his death.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added) 
(quoting N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.1 (McKinney 1998)).  The court found California 
probate law similar to that of New York in that it requires a testator to control all property he or she 
intends to transfer at the time of his or her death.  Id. (“A will passes all property the testator owns at 
death, including property acquired after execution of the will.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(emphasis added) (quoting CAL. PROB. CODE § 21105 (West 1991)).
117
Id. at 317–19.
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disposition would be rendered invalid “because she had no legal right to dispose of 
property that did not exist at the time of her death.”118 Third, the court held that 
neither the California nor the Indiana119 postmortem right of publicity statute 
allowed an individual to pass a statutory property right by will that he or she did 
not possess at the time of his or her death.120 Regarding California, the court 
reasoned that since section 3344.1 only allows an individual to transfer his or her 
right of publicity “by contract or by means of a trust or testamentary 
documents”121—an act that cannot be accomplished by a deceased individual—a
postmortem transfer cannot occur.122 Similarly, the Indiana statute requires 
transfer by “contract, license, gift, trust, or testamentary document”—each of 
which requires a living testator.123 Accordingly, the court concluded that neither 
statute granted a right of publicity that could be transferred through the will of a 
deceased personality—like Monroe—who had died by the time of the statute’s
enactment.124
C. California’s First Ruling on Monroe’s Right of Publicity
The estate of Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. (“MHG”), a second Monroe 
photographer, filed a contemporaneous action against CMG, MMLLC, and Anna 
Strasberg in the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California.125 As in New York, CMG and MMLLC (“Plaintiffs”) argued that they 
owned the right of publicity “in and to the Marilyn Monroe name, image, and 
persona”126 as granted by Indiana’s postmortem right of publicity statute.127
118
Id. at 318 (“A testator is presumed, as a matter of law, to know that he cannot dispose of 
property over which he has no testamentary power, including property he does not own at the time of 
his death.”).
The 
court granted MHG’s motion for summary judgment, holding that Plaintiffs lacked 
119 New York was not considered because it does not have a postmortem right of publicity statute.  
Id. at 314.
120
Id. at 319.
121
Id. at 319 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 1997)).
122
Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 319 (“Since a testamentary transfer has no effect 
until the testator’s death, [a transfer of a publicity right] could not be effectuated ‘before death’ for 
purposes of the California statute.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123
Id. (quoting IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1 to -20 (West 2009)).
124
Id. at 320.  The court did not decide the question of where Monroe was domiciled at the time of 
her death because the court felt that such a decision would not impact the outcome of the case since the 
relevant laws of both California and New York were similar.  Id. at 315.
125
Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. 05-02200 MMM (MCx), 2008 
WL 655604, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008).  The case was consolidated with another action filed in the 
Central District of California, Tom Kelley Studio, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc. (CV 05-2568).  Id.
Later, the court consolidated two additional actions with the pending case: CMG Worldwide, Inc. v. 
Tom Kelley Studios (CV 05-5973) and CMG Worldwide, Inc. v. The Milton H. Greene Archives (CV 
05-7627).  Id. These later additions were originally filed by CMG and MMLLC in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana where they were eventually transferred to California.  
Id.
126
Id. Specifically, Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants infringed Monroe’s right of publicity by 
using her name, image, and likeness “in connection with the sale, solicitation, promotion, and 
advertising of products, merchandise, goods and services” without first seeking the consent and 
authorization of Plaintiffs.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
127
Id.; see §§ 32-36-1-1 to -20.
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standing to assert Monroe’s right of publicity.128 Specifically, the court reasoned 
that Monroe “could not have devised a non-statutory right of publicity through her 
will, and also could not have devised subsequently created statutory rights that did 
not come into existence until decades after her death.”129 In reaching this decision, 
Judge Morrow examined California’s right of publicity statute130 and the 
legislative intent behind the statute, finding that for personalities who died before 
the statute’s enactment, the statute vested the postmortem right of publicity “in 
designated heirs rather than in the ‘personality’ himself or herself.”131
However, Judge Morrow reached her decision “with reluctance” due to the 
detrimental effect such ruling would have on charities who had been bestowed the 
residuary estates of celebrities who had died before the enactment of the California 
statute in 1984.132 In accordance with the court’s order, such charities would be 
“divested” of the deceased celebrity’s right of publicity.133 Thus, while limiting 
the extent of postmortem rights of publicity—and essentially echoing the New 
York court’s decision—Judge Morrow strongly noted that the ruling did not 
prevent “the California or Indiana legislature from enacting a right of publicity 
statute that vested the right directly in the residuary beneficiaries of a deceased 
personality’s estate, or in the successors-in-interest of those residuary 
beneficiaries.”134
D. Legislative Response to the Limitation on Monroe’s Postmortem Right of 
Publicity
Six weeks after the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California’s order was entered, the California State Legislature accepted Judge 
Morrow’s invitation to enact a postmortem right of publicity.135 State Senator 
Shelia Kuehl amended Senate Bill 771 (“SB 771”) to abrogate the New York and 
California courts’ summary judgment rulings and to clarify the meaning of
California’s right of publicity statute.136 Supported by the Screen Actors Guild137
128
Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *1.
129
Id.
130
Id.; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 1997).
131
Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *1.  The court based its reasoning on the presumption that the 
California State Legislature created the statute while remaining conscious of the common law 
prescription that “a testator cannot devise property not owned at the time of death.”  Id. Moreover, the 
court believed its interpretation of the statute was correct in light of the relevant legislative history, 
which revealed no legislative intent that was contrary to the established principles of property and 
probate law.  Id.
132
Id. at *2.  Once section 3344.1 of the California Civil Code was enacted, these charities 
believed that they controlled the celebrity’s right of publicity.  Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.  Consequently, federal courts in both California and New York interpreted California’s 
postmortem right of publicity statute as prohibiting publicity rights from passing under a deceased 
celebrity’s will if that celebrity died before January 1, 1985—the effective date of section 3344.1 of the 
California Civil Code. But see Milton H. Green Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc. 568 F. Supp. 
2d 1152, 1197 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that celebrities who died within seventy years prior to 1985 
are deemed to possess a posthumous right of publicity at the time of their death).
135
Milton, 2008 WL 655604 at *2.
136
Id.; see also S.B. 771, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Cal. 2007) (“It is the intent of the Legislature 
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and numerous celebrities,138 SB 771 passed both houses of the California State 
Legislature and was signed into law by Governor Schwarzenegger on October 10, 
2007.139 SB 771 expressly provides that all celebrities who died within seventy 
years of January 1, 1985, have a retroactive postmortem right of publicity that is 
deemed to have existed at the time of his or her death.140 Additionally, SB 771 
asserts that a deceased celebrity’s postmortem right of publicity “shall vest in the 
persons entitled to [receive it] under the testamentary instrument of the deceased 
personality effective as of the date of his or her death.”141
to abrogate the summary judgment orders entered in The Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG 
Worldwide, Inc., . . . and in Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc. . . . .”), available at
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_0751-0800/sb_771_bill_20071010_chaptered.html.
Furthermore, SB 771 
137
See Screen Actors Guild, Contact the Governor in Support of California Assembly Bill SB 771, 
http://www.sag.org/content/contact-governor-support-california-assembly-bill-sb-771 (last visited Oct. 
12, 2009).  Screen Actors Guild urged its members to write to Governor Schwarzenegger asking him to 
sign SB 771 into law.  Id. The organization posted a sample letter on its website for members to use 
when contacting Governor Schwarzenegger.  Id. The letter stated, in pertinent part: 
SB 771 is critical to protect creative artists from constant attempts to 
commercially exploit their images . . . .  [It] must be enacted to protect artists’ 
likeness from potentially offensive commercial uses and to make sure that their 
legends and legacies are not corrupted.  The current law must be clarified in order 
to ensure that a deceased personality’s images will be protected in accordance 
with his or her wishes.  I believe SB 771 will accomplish this objective.
Id.
138 Sheila Kuehl, California State Senator, Senate Judiciary Committee, SB 771 Bill Analysis 1 
(Sept. 6, 2007), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_0751-0800/sb_771_cfa_
20070906_123814_sen_comm.html.  John Wayne’s son, President of Wayne Enterprises and a 
supporter of SB 771, expressed that the use of John Wayne’s name and likeness enables the estate to 
support the John Wayne Cancer Foundation and the John Wayne Cancer Institute.  Id. at 9.  He added 
that “legislative protections regarding rights of publicity assist [the estate] in assuring that the use of 
John Wayne’s personality is meaningful and appropriate.”  Id. Wayne’s son may be justified in his 
worry about the damage to his father’s image if exploitation is not limited.  See Patrick McGreevy, Bill 
Attempts to Protect Dead Stars’ Images, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2007, at B1, available at http://msl1.mit.
edu/furdlog/docs/latimes/2007-07-23_latimes_portmortem_publicity_rights .pdf(“There was a public 
debate in the late 1990s when movie images of John Wayne were digitally inserted into a Coors beer 
commercial after his death.”).  Additional deceased celebrities whose rights of publicity provide support 
to charitable organizations include Albert Einstein, Janis Joplin, Alfred Hitchcock, Elvis Presley, Jimi 
Hendrix, and John Steinbeck.  Kuehl, supra, at 8–10.
139
Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *2.  Although SB 771 received substantial support from 
celebrities, deceased celebrities’ estates, and charitable organizations, individual photographers and 
their estates strongly opposed the bill’s retroactive effect, claiming that such effect would cause 
substantial damage to “any business that is based on photographs or reproductions of famous people.”
Kuehl, supra note 138, at 10.
140
Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *3.
141 S.B. 771, § 1.  SB 771 amends section 3344.1(b) to provide, in pertinent part:
The rights recognized under this section are property rights, freely transferable or 
descendible, in whole or in part, by contract or by means of any trust or any other 
testamentary instrument, executed before or after January 1, 1985. The rights 
recognized under this section shall be deemed to have existed at the time of death 
of any deceased personality who died prior to January 1, 1985, and, except as 
provided in subdivision (o), shall vest in the persons entitled to these property 
rights under the testamentary instrument of the deceased personality effective as 
of the date of his or her death. In the absence of an express transfer in a 
testamentary instrument of the deceased personality’s rights in his or her name, 
voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, a provision in the testamentary 
instrument that provides for the disposition of the residue of the deceased 
personality’s assets shall be effective to transfer the rights recognized under this 
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clearly provides that a celebrity’s postmortem right of publicity is retroactive, 
applying to deceased personalities who died before January 1, 1985.142
Following the passage of SB 771, on November 21, 2007, MMLLC filed a 
motion for reconsideration of the United States District Court for the Central
District of California’s order granting summary judgment for MHG.143
Specifically, MMLLC sought reconsideration of the court’s prior three 
conclusions: (1) that under either California or New York law, Monroe lacked the 
testamentary capacity to devise a right of publicity through the residual clause of 
her will; (2) that Monroe’s estate was not an entity capable of holding title to a 
right of publicity; and (3) that MMLLC and CMG lack the requisite standing to 
assert Monroe’s right of publicity.144 Judge Morrow granted MMLLC’s motion 
for reconsideration.145 Judge Morrow’s decision is analyzed in the next section.146
IV. THE MILTON H. GREENE ARCHIVES, INC. V. CMG WORLDWIDE, INC. DECISION
A. Judge Morrow’s Opinion: Right of Publicity
District Judge Margaret M. Morrow introduced her opinion with a brief 
recitation of the facts147 followed by a detailed procedural history.148
section in accordance with the terms of that provision. The rights established by 
this section shall also be freely transferable or descendible by contract, trust, or 
any other testamentary instrument by any subsequent owner of the deceased 
personality’s rights as recognized by this section. Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to render invalid or unenforceable any contract entered into by a 
deceased personality during his or her lifetime by which the deceased personality 
assigned the rights, in whole or in part, to use his or her name, voice, signature, 
photograph or likeness, regardless of whether the contract was entered into 
before or after January 1, 1985.
Judge 
Morrow then began the discussion with an explanation of the requirements that 
Id.  Newly-added subsection (o) offers an exception to subsection (b) for parties—here, MMLLC and 
CMG—who exercised postmortem rights of publicity under section 3344.1 prior to SB 771.  Id.
Subsection (o) provides:
Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, if an action was 
taken prior to May 1, 2007, to exercise rights recognized under this section 
relating to a deceased personality who died prior to January 1, 1985, by a person 
described in subdivision (d), other than a person who was disinherited by the 
deceased personality in a testamentary instrument, and the exercise of those 
rights was not challenged successfully in a court action by a person described in 
subdivision (b), that exercise shall not be affected by subdivision (b). In such a 
case, the rights that would otherwise vest in one or more persons described in 
subdivision (b) shall vest solely in the person or persons described in subdivision 
(d), other than a person disinherited by the deceased personality in a testamentary 
instrument, for all future purposes.
Id.
142
Id. Newly-added subsection (p) provides: “The rights recognized by this section are expressly 
made retroactive, including to those deceased personalities who died before January 1, 1985.”  Id.
143
Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *2.
144
Id.
145
Id. at *13.
146
See supra Part IV.
147
Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *1.
148
Id. at *1–2.
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must be satisfied in order for a motion for reconsideration to be “proper”149
followed by a brief legislative history of SB 771.150
Next, Judge Morrow determined the effect of the legislature’s enactment of 
SB 771 on the present case.151 Applying the laws of statutory construction, she 
recognized that a statute only has “retrospective effect when it substantially 
changes the legal consequences of past events[,]”152 not when it merely clarifies 
existing law.153 However, Judge Morrow also explained that a clarifying statute 
can be applied to cases predating the statute’s enactment without being viewed as 
“retroactive” if such statute merely serves as “a statement of what the law has 
always been.”154 In determining whether SB 771 was enacted to clarify 
California’s existing right of publicity statute or to create a new law, Judge 
Morrow examined the circumstances surrounding the legislature’s change to the 
statute—namely, the ambiguity present in the current right of publicity statute, the 
legislature’s intent in passing SB 771, and the speed at which SB 771 was 
enacted.155
149
Id. at *2.  Local Rule 7-18 of the Central District of California limits when a party can seek 
reconsideration of a court’s prior decision on a motion.  Id. Under Local Rule 7-18, a motion for 
reconsideration is “proper” only where the moving party demonstrates:
MMLLC argued that SB 771 clarified California’s right of publicity 
(a) [A] material difference in fact or law from that presented to the Court before 
such decision that in the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have been 
known to the party moving for reconsideration at the time of such decision, or (b) 
the emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time 
of such decision, or (c) a manifest showing of a failure to consider material facts 
presented to the Court before such decision.
Id. (quoting C.D. Cal. R. 7-18). Since MMLLC did not state the basis on which it sought 
reconsideration under Local Rule 7-18, Judge Morrow concluded that MMLLC based its argument on 
the belief that the legislature’s attempt to clarify section 3344.1 constituted “a material difference in fact 
or law” that could not have been shown to the court prior to its summary judgment ruling, or that the 
enactment of SB 771 qualified as “the emergence of new material facts or a change of law” overruling 
the prior ruling.  Id. (quoting C.D. Cal. R. 7-18).
150
See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.  Reviewing the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
report, Judge Morrow concluded that Senator Kuehl “believed that the court erred in ruling that Marilyn 
Monroe did not possess a statutory right of publicity when she died and thus that the right could not 
pass to the residuary beneficiary under her will.”  Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *3.
151
Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *4.
152
Id. (quoting W. Sec. Bank v. Superior Court, 933 P.2d 507, 513 (Cal. 1997)).
153
Id. at *5 (“[A] statute that merely clarifies, rather than changes, existing law does not operate 
retrospectively even if applied to transactions predating its enactment.” (quoting W. Sec. Bank, 933 P.2d 
at 514)).
154
Id. (citing In re Marriage of Fellows, 138 P.3d 200, 202 (Cal. 2006)).  As set forth in the case:
[T]he enactment of a statute or an amendment to a statute for the purpose of 
clarifying preexisting law or making express the original legislative intent is not 
considered a change in the law; . . . it simply states the law as it was all the time, 
and no question of retroactive application is involved.
Id. (quoting City of Redlands v. Sorensen, 221 Cal. Rptr. 728, 732 (Ct. App. 1985)).
155
Id. Judge Morrow remarked that a relevant circumstance in this examination was “whether the 
legislature’s changes are a prompt reaction to the emergence of a novel question of statutory 
interpretation.”  Id. (“If the amendment was enacted soon after controversies arose as to the 
interpretation of the original act, it is logical to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of 
the original act—a formal change—rebutting the presumption of substantial change.” (quoting RN 
Review for Nurses, Inc. v. California, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 354, 357 (Ct. App. 1994))).  Judge Morrow also 
asserted that a legislature’s declaration of intent when enacting the statute may reflect the entity’s 
purpose in achieving a retrospective result. Id. at *6 (“Thus, where a statute provides that it clarifies or 
2009 PROTECTING CELEBRITY LEGACIES 185
statute in two primary ways: that a postmortem right of publicity in California 
existed at the time of death of a celebrity prior to January 1, 1985,156 and that the 
right of publicity is descendible by any testamentary instrument executed before or 
after January 1, 1985.157
Applying the guidelines for statutory construction established by the 
California Supreme Court and examining the circumstances surrounding the 
legislature’s passage of SB 771, Judge Morrow reasoned that SB 771 constitutes “a
clarification of existing law.”158 First, she held that SB 771 was passed in order 
“to clarify potential ambiguities” in section 3344.1 that have led to confusion 
among deceased celebrities’ beneficiaries and heirs.159 Noting that various 
charitable institutions, who exist as recipients of deceased celebrities’ residuary 
estates, have relied on their ability to support themselves through the exploitation 
of deceased celebrities’ rights of publicity, Judge Morrow found it appropriate for 
the legislature to clarify the statute to protect such significant expectations.160
declares existing law, it is obvious that such a provision is indicative of a legislative intent that the 
amendment apply to all existing causes of action from the date of its enactment.” (quoting W. Sec. 
Bank, 933 P.2d at 515)).
Furthermore, Judge Morrow established that SB 771 clearly confirms that the right 
of publicity recognized by section 3344.1 “existed at the time a predeceased 
celebrity died; sets forth the manner in which the right of publicity can be 
transferred; and declares that the rights recognized by [section] 3344.1 are 
156
Id.  MMLLC argued the legislature’s intent that a celebrity who died prior to the statute’s 
passage still held the right of publicity at the time of death is illustrated “from the fact that section 
3344.1 ‘always’ defined a ‘deceased personality’ as any person who died within seventy years of 
January 1, 1985.”  Id. MMLLC also found Senator Kuehl’s statement that “nothing in the statute . . . 
indicates the Legislature intended to treat people differently depending on whether they died before or 
after 1985” significant.  Id. (citing Kuehl, supra note 138, at 5).
157
Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *7.
158
Id. at *8.
159
Id. at *13.  Judge Morrow found it significant that the meaning of section 3344.1 has never been 
“finally and definitively” interpreted by California’s highest court.  Id. at *8 (citing Carter v. Cal. Dep’t 
of Veterans Affairs, 135 P.3d 637, 642 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)).  Judge Morrow agreed with MMLLC that 
the definition of “deceased personality” as stated in subsection (h) of section 3344.1 (any natural person 
who “died within seventy years prior to January 1, 1985”) “injects ambiguity” into the language of 
subsection (b) of section 3344.1, which enables a deceased personality to transfer his or her right of 
publicity before his or her death.  Id. at *11; see supra note 94 and accompanying text.  Since “deceased 
personality” includes any individual who died within seventy years of January 1, 1985, MMLLC 
asserted that the California State Legislature “must have contemplated that celebrities who predeceased 
the enactment would be deemed to have held the right before their death and to have had the ability to 
transfer it via a residual clause in their will.”  Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *11.  Judge Morrow 
reasoned that this possible ambiguity is addressed by SB 771.  Id.  Moreover, she believed that SB 771 
“makes explicit what was at best implicit, and at worst ambiguous, in the original version of [section] 
3344.1.”  Id.
160
Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *11.  Judge Morrow further explained—and reiterated her 
previous worry—that while such charitable organizations recognize that the celebrity whose right of 
publicity they hold died prior to 1985, they believed that the celebrity was able to transfer such right in 
accordance with section 3344.1.  Id.; see infra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.  To illustrate, 
Albert Einstein, who died in 1955, bequeathed his right of publicity to the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem, a university co-founded by Einstein.  Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *11.  While Defendants 
argued that SB 771 cannot qualify as a clarification since it substantially changes prior law, Judge 
Morrow explained that the material changes implemented by SB 771 are not viewed as modifications 
due to the dire need to dispel the ambiguities present in the original version of section 3344.1.  Id. at 
*12.
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retroactive to celebrities who died before January 1, 1985.”161 Second, Judge 
Morrow found it indicative that the legislature explicitly stated that it was its intent 
when passing SB 771 to clarify existing law.162 As highlighted by MMLLC, the 
legislative history of SB 771 contains several statements indicating that the bill 
was passed in order to clarify the meaning of the existing right of publicity statute 
in California.163 Lastly, Judge Morrow recognized the importance in the timing of 
SB’s passage into law.164 In agreement with MMLLC, Judge Morrow reasoned 
that the fact that “SB 771 was introduced, passed, and signed into law within five 
months of the court’s order” signified that the court should respect the legislature’s
intent to clarify existing law.165
After recognizing SB 771 as a new law that clarifies California’s postmortem 
right of publicity statute, Judge Morrow concluded that the court must reconsider 
its prior ruling that MMLLC lacks standing to argue Defendants’ infringement of 
Monroe’s right of publicity.166 As clarified, section 3344.1 establishes that 
Monroe’s right of publicity existed at the time of her death in 1962.167
161
Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *12.  By providing such clear declarations, Judge Morrow 
concluded that SB 771 eliminates the future need to research numerous legal sources in order to fully 
and accurately understand the statute’s meaning.  Id.
Since 
Monroe did not expressly bequeath her right of publicity in her will, Judge Morrow 
162
Id. at *8 (“In interpreting a statute, a California court must determine legislative intent so as to 
effectuate the purpose of the law.”).
163
Id.; see Kuehl, supra note 138, at 1 (“SB 771 intends to clarify the Legislature’s intent to make 
the protections under 3344.1 of the Civil Code applicable to deceased personalities who died between 
January 1, 1915 and January 1, 1985, the seventy year period of protection under the statute.”).  
Moreover, SB 771’s legislative history highlights that the bill “would indeed clarify 3344.1 in several 
ways,” effectively abrogating the court’s prior summary judgment order.  See Kuehl, supra note 138, at 
5.
164
Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *9.
165
Id. *7.  “[I]n June 2007, after the court entered its May 14, 2007 order construing the statute,” 
Senator Kuehl amended SB 771 to address section 3344.1.  Id. at *9.  Once amended, the bill passed in 
the Assembly without a single negative vote.  Id.  On September 7, 2007, SB 771 was approved by the 
Senate—again, receiving not one negative vote.  Id.  “On October 10, 2007, . . . [a mere] five months 
after the court entered a final order, Governor Schwarzenegger signed [SB 771] into law.”  Id.; see W. 
Sec. Bank v. Superior Court, 933 P.2d 507, 515 (Cal. 1997) (“If the Legislature acts promptly to correct 
a perceived problem with a judicial construction of a statute, the courts generally give the Legislature’s 
action its intended effect.”).  Judge Morrow recognized a “direct link between the court’s May 14, 2007 
decision and SB 771” due to the Senate Judiciary Committee’s clear description of how Monroe’s right 
of publicity would be transferred under SB 771 direction.  Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *7.  
Specifically, Monroe’s postmortem right of publicity would have initially passed to Lee Strasberg under 
the residuary clause of Monroe’s will.  Id. Next, the right would have been transferred via will to Lee 
Strasberg’s wife, Anna Strasberg.  Id. This transfer would have vested Anna Strasberg with the power 
to transfer the right to MMLLC.  Id. Lastly, MMLLC can license the ability to use Monroe’s image and 
likeness—as granted by the right of publicity—to CMG.  Id.  Accordingly, the legislature clearly 
intended both to “abrogate the court’s interpretation of [section] 3344.1” and to “delineate how the 
statute should be applied” in the present case.  Id.; see Kuehl, supra note 138, at 6.  Moreover, Judge 
Morrow squashed Defendants’ argument that the court’s interpretation of SB 771 conflicted with 
general probate law.  Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *13.  Under SB 771, a celebrity owns his or her right 
of publicity at the time of death.  Id. at *13 n.33.  Such language clearly conforms to probate law, which 
only considers what a decedent owned at the time of death when interpreting a will.  Id. Accordingly, 
Monroe clearly had the power to transfer her right of publicity—a property right she owned at the time 
of her death—through the residuary clause of her will.  Id.
166
Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *13.
167
Id.
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next examined the residual clause of Monroe’s will.168 Finding that the right of 
publicity existed at the time of Monroe’s death and that such right was not 
expressly bestowed in her will, Judge Morrow concluded that the right was 
transferred under the will’s residual clause to Lee Strasberg and other residual 
beneficiaries.169 Accordingly, even though both Monroe and Lee Strasberg died 
prior to the enactment of section 3344.1 in 1985, Monroe’s right of publicity 
“passed to [Lee] Strasberg as Monroe’s residuary beneficiary at the time of her 
death, and from [Lee] Strasberg to Anna Strasberg at the time of his death.”170
Thus, since MMLLC was the final recipient of Monroe’s right of publicity, Judge 
Morrow reasoned that MMLLC currently possessed the right and clearly had 
standing to challenge Defendants’ alleged infringement of such right.171
Lastly, Judge Morrow recognized that her decision highlights the stark and 
significant differences between the laws of California and New York—the two 
states in which Monroe could have been domiciled at the time of her death—
regarding the right of publicity.172 Under California’s newly-clarified section 
3344.1, MMLLC was able to argue Monroe’s right of publicity, whereas in New 
York, Monroe’s right of publicity was extinguished at the time of her death and 
prohibited MMLLC from arguing any claims with respect to this right.173
Accordingly, since an individual can only have one domicile at a time,174 the 
parties’ factual dispute regarding Monroe’s domicile at the time of her death 
becomes relevant in the present case.175 Consequently, Judge Morrow concluded 
that the numerous factors that must be considered in determining an individual’s
domicile required that the issue of Monroe’s domicile be deferred until the parties 
could produce sufficient evidence to permit the court to make such 
determination.176
168
Id. at *14; see supra note 104 and accompanying text.
169
Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *14.
170
Id. at *14 n.37.  Judge Morrow reasoned that such series of transactions of the right of publicity 
is granted by section 3344.1 as clarified by SB 771.  Id. at *14.
171
Id. Judge Morrow’s decision correctly followed the principles of property law whereby an 
individual has a transferable right of publicity to exclusively protect and control the economic value of 
his or her name and likeness.  See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 8, at 1127.  Moreover, Judge Morrow 
recognized and honored the goals of the California State Legislature in granting an individual—who 
may or may not have been alive at the time the right of publicity statute was officially enacted—the 
right to continue such protection and control over his or her identity for a specific period after his or her 
death.  See Kuehl, supra note 138.
172
Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *14–15.
173
Id. Under New York law, the right of publicity is exclusively statutory, is personal to the 
individual, and is extinguished upon his or her death.  Id. at *15; see supra notes 95–97 and 
accompanying text.
174
Milton, 2008 WL 655604, at *15.  An individual’s domicile is defined as his or her “permanent 
home, where [he or] she resides with the intention to remain or to which [he or] she intends to return.”  
Id. (quoting Gaudin v. Remis, 379 F.3d 631, 636 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 
F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001)).
175
Id.
176
Id. at *15–16.  Judge Morrow stated a partial list of factors to be used in determining domicile, 
including an individual’s “current residence, voting registration and voting practices, location of 
personal and real property, location of brokerage and bank accounts, location of spouse and family, 
membership in unions and other organizations, place of employment or business, driver’s license and 
automobile registration, and payment of taxes.”  Id. at *15.  Judge Morrow also briefly discussed the 
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B. Judge Morrow’s Opinion: Domicile
On July 31, 2008, Judge Morrow ended the Monroe dispute once and for all 
when she determined that CMG and MMLLC were estopped from asserting that 
Monroe was domiciled in California at the time of Monroe’s death.177 After 
analyzing a variety of factors—specifically, statements made by Monroe’s estate to 
the California Inheritance Tax Appraiser indicating that Monroe was a New York 
resident—Judge Morrow concluded that Monroe was domiciled in New York at 
the time of her death.178 Accordingly, California’s postmortem right of publicity 
was inapplicable as to Monroe, and, under New York law, Monroe’s right of 
publicity was extinguished at the time of her death.179
V. IMPACT OF THE MILTON H. GREENE ARCHIVES, INC. V. CMG WORLDWIDE, INC.
DECISION
A. Generally
Judge Morrow’s holding that the right of publicity is descendible and that 
such right was possessed by a celebrity who died within seventy years of the 
enactment of section 3344.1 in 1985 proves to be a major win for the estates of 
deceased celebrities.180
evidence adduced by both parties.  Id. at *16.  Defendants based their argument that Monroe was 
domiciled in New York at the time of her death on representations allegedly made by MMLLC and 
CMG in public documents—evidence Judge Morrow did not believe bore on an individual’s domicile.  
Id. MMLLC and CMG argued that the fact that Monroe purchased a home in California in 1962—the 
year of her death—licensed a dog in California, attended psychotherapy sessions in Los Angeles, and 
maintained a Connecticut driver’s license with a California address all proved that Monroe was 
domiciled in California.  Id.
However, the decision also highlights the shortcomings of 
New York’s right of publicity statute and the need for the New York State 
Legislature to adopt a similar postmortem right of publicity statute as that currently 
adopted in California.  As long as New York law continues to prohibit a 
descendible right of publicity, the ability of a celebrity who “lives” both in 
California and New York to control his or her identity post death will ultimately be 
177
See Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (C.D. Cal. 
2008).
178
Id. at 1197–99.  Statements made by the executor of Monroe’s estate and by counsel for the 
estate showed that Monroe was a non-resident of California at the time of her death and that her home 
in Los Angeles was a temporary residence and used primarily for when she was filming movies in 
California.  Id. at 1160–61.  Accordingly, Judge Morrow held that MMLLC and CMG were judicially 
estopped from arguing that Monroe was domiciled in California at the time of her death due to the 
inconsistent positions previously taken by Monroe’s estate before the California Inheritance Tax 
Appraiser.  Id. at 1197–99.  By claiming that Monroe was a New York resident and presenting evidence 
that she viewed New York as her permanent residence, Monroe’s estate succeeded in drastically 
reducing their California inheritance tax liabilities.  Id.  Therefore, Judge Morrow reasoned that 
MMLLC and CMG would obtain an “unfair advantage” if allowed to claim now that Monroe was 
actually domiciled in California at the time of her death to gain access to Monroe’s postmortem right of 
publicity under California law.  Id. at 1197.  In effect, by minimizing their exposure to California’s 
inheritance tax laws, Monroe’s estate undermined a future claim to Monroe’s postmortem right of 
publicity under California law.  Id.
179
See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.
180
See Milton, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1152.
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determined by a single factor—domicile.
Society as a whole will benefit immensely if New York enacts a reasonably 
restricted postmortem right of publicity.181 Such right will protect both the heirs 
and beneficiaries of the deceased celebrity and the vendors who have obtained 
authorized licenses to exploit the celebrity’s image and likeness.182 Furthermore, 
if limited in duration, a postmortem right of publicity can establish commercial 
certainty and provide economic incentives for all involved.183
B. Commercial Control
Lastly, uniformity 
in two states where most celebrities split their time will potentially eliminate the 
likelihood of forum-shopping in an attempt to protect a deceased celebrity’s right 
of publicity.
New York’s non-divisible right of publicity substantially limits a celebrity’s
ability to effectively control the commercial exploitation of his or her identity.184
By eliminating the power to control a celebrity’s image upon his or her death, New 
York law conflicts with the underlying basis for the right of publicity: to grant 
individuals the exclusive power to exercise control over some entity and to exclude 
others from exercising such control.185 The primary line of reasoning holds that if 
a celebrity had the right to control his or her right of publicity while alive, the 
celebrity’s heirs and designated beneficiaries should be empowered to control and 
reap the rewards from such right after the celebrity’s death.186 To illustrate, 
although Monroe died in 1962, her name and image continue to exist as a valuable 
commercial package in today’s society—over four decades after her passing.187
However, a significant aspect of the brand’s success is most definitely attributed to 
Monroe’s estate, which has carefully marketed and controlled her image in order to 
promote consistency and protect her iconic fame.188
181 Marc A. Lieberstein, Why a Reasonable Right of Publicity Should Survive Death: A Rebuttal,
BRIGHT IDEAS (N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Albany, N.Y.), Fall 2008, at 9.
By essentially eliminating 
Monroe’s right of publicity at her time of death, and thus preventing her estate 
from regulating such right, the New York State Legislature has increased the 
likelihood that vendors will use Monroe’s image in an offensive manner in order to 
182
Id.
183
Id.
184 Mulrooney, supra note 38, at 1154.  Since New York’s right of publicity is “rooted within a 
right of privacy statute,” it highlights the many shortcomings present when enacted under privacy law 
rather than the less-restrictive property law.  Id. at 1154–55; see supra notes 95–97 and accompanying 
text.
185 Felcher & Rubin, supra note 8, at 1128.
186 Lieberstein, supra note 181, at 9–10; see Carpenter, supra note 36, para. 12 (referring to the 
argument for commercial control as the “labor desert theory”).
187 Lieberstein, supra note 181, at 9.  Monroe’s beauty and aura have transcended decades, and her 
name continues to represent “beauty, sensuality, and glamour.”  Id.
188
Id. The author argues that “the Monroe name” may represent an entirely different concept—if 
anything at all—but for the estate’s “brand stewardship.”  Id.; see Kuehl, supra note 138, at 9 
(“[MMLLC] has carefully guarded the publicity rights of Marilyn Monroe’s image in order to maintain 
her legacy as she intended.”).
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achieve monetary benefits.189
The advantages of a postmortem right of publicity are also apparent in the 
world of advertising.  By recognizing a postmortem right of publicity, New York 
will protect its consumers from deceptive advertising.190 As evident in today’s
highly-commercialized society, celebrity sponsorships are instrumental in both 
defining a company’s message and providing a competitive advantage.191 As
many advertising firms have discovered, the “association between a product and a 
celebrity, living or deceased, creates an indelible image in the consumer’s mind, 
which translates into product recognition, and ultimately, sales.”192 Specifically, 
the commercial appeal in using a celebrity’s image to support a product or service 
derives from “its duration and exclusivity.”193 If a celebrity’s identity enters the 
public domain instantly upon death—as is the case in New York—the value of 
endorsement contracts entered into during the celebrity’s lifetime are greatly 
diminished as the power of control is lost.194 Moreover, the doctrine of the right of 
publicity aims to hold advertisers accountable for any misleading use of a celebrity 
image where the celebrity is not actually associated with the marketer of the 
image.195
A postmortem right of publicity also provides commercial certainty for 
vendors.196  Under New York law, the exclusivity of a license to use a celebrity’s
image for commercial purposes—the most valuable asset of a celebrity license—
lacks a fixed termination date and ends immediately upon a celebrity’s death.197
Accordingly, a vendor in New York must accept the inevitable: once a celebrity 
dies, his or her image is available to the public at large, thereby impairing its 
economic value and eroding the concept of commercial certainty.198
189 Lieberstein, supra note 181, at 10.
Alternatively, 
under California’s postmortem right of publicity statute, a vendor knows the exact 
date on which the celebrity’s identity is accessible for consumer conception—
190
Id.; see supra note 138 and accompanying text.
191
See Lieberstein, supra note 181, at 10.
192 Roesler, supra note 66, at 9.  To illustrate, after Converse Inc. (“Converse”) discovered a 
photograph of James Dean wearing Converse sneakers, the company launched an advertising campaign 
focused on the picture and the association of the celebrity with its product.  Id.  Immediately following 
the launch of the campaign, Converse’s sales increased by fifty percent.  Id.
193 Lieberstein, supra note 181, at 10.  For example, it is well known that golf star Tiger Woods 
endorses Nike, Inc. (“Nike”) apparel and that Nike continues to invest millions to maintain the 
exclusivity of this relationship.  However, under New York law, once Tiger Woods dies, competing 
apparel companies, such as Adidas, could use Tiger Woods’ identity to promote their clothing lines.  
Such actions by competing companies will not only convince the public that Tiger Woods endorses 
their products as well, but also destroy the exclusive relationship Nike has created with Tiger Woods.  
Id.
194
Id. A postmortem right of publicity maintains the value of a right to publicity for sponsors who 
acquired such right “to promote and market the name as their own.”  Id.
195 Carpenter, supra note 36, para. 13 (comparing the harms protected by the right of publicity to 
those addressed by trademark law, which seeks to protect consumers against deceptive use of a symbol 
or phrase normally associated with a well-known brand or product).
196 Westfall & Landau, supra note 33, at 87–88.
197
Id.
198
Id.
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seventy years after the celebrity’s death.199
Lastly, while some commentators have argued that the commercial control 
over a deceased celebrity’s identity may ultimately lead to a monopoly, this 
proposition can easily be dispelled if New York enacts a postmortem right of 
publicity that lasts for a limited duration.200
C. Economic Incentive
  In essence, confining the length of a 
right of publicity bestows the deceased celebrity’s estate with the power to control 
while also ensuring that the public will inherit free access to the image at a 
specified time.
The social policy that supports an argument for a postmortem right of 
publicity is that such right encourages “individual enterprise and creativity” by 
allowing individuals to profit from their own efforts.201 While the media certainly 
has the power to transform—both positively and negatively—a celebrity’s status, a 
celebrity’s fame is ultimately the product of his or her efforts and personal 
investment.202  Accordingly, a celebrity—and eventually, his or her heirs—should 
be entitled to reap maximum commercial benefits.203
[E]very person is entitled to the fruit of his labors unless there are important 
countervailing public policy considerations.  Yet, because of the inadequacy of 
traditional legal theories . . . persons who have long and laboriously nurtured the 
fruit of publicity values may be deprived of them, unless judicial recognition is 
given to what is here referred to as the right of publicity—that is, the right of each 
person to control and profit from the publicity values which he has created or 
purchased.
As argued first in the 1950s:
204
Similarly, providing celebrities with control over how their rights of 
publicity will be managed in the future increases the probability that they “will 
make investments in themselves that serve the public interest.”205 The Supreme 
Court has acknowledged that an individual’s right of publicity depends entirely on 
the associative value of his or her identity.206
199
Id.; see supra note 159 and accompanying text.
To illustrate, in Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting, the Court noted that an individual’s right of publicity “rests 
on more than a desire to compensate the performer for the time and effort invested 
200 Hogue & Garfinkel, supra note 60, at 665 (arguing that the public’s interest in free 
dissemination of ideas competes with a celebrity’s interest in controlling the exploitation of his or her 
identity).
201 Felcher & Rubin, supra note 8, at 1128.
202 Lieberstein, supra note 181, at 10.  The development of a celebrity’s status requires the 
combination of “money, time, and energy.”  Id.
203 Mulrooney, supra note 38, at 1155.  Proponents highlight how the transfer quality present in 
other forms of intellectual property—copyright, trademark, and patent—promotes economic efficiency.  
Id.; see Lieberstein, supra note 181, at 10 (“Since the celebrity has created a valuable capital asset, it is 
consistent with the celebrity’s expectation that this asset will benefit his [or her] heirs and assigns after 
his [or her] death.”).
204 Lieberstein, supra note 181, at 10 (citing Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 216 (1954)).
205 Mulrooney, supra note 38, at 1155.
206 Roesler, supra note 66, at 5.
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in the act; the protection provide[s] an economic incentive for him [or her] to make 
the investment required to produce a performance of interest to the public.”207
Moreover, a postmortem right of publicity enables a celebrity to transfer the 
awards produced from his or her efforts to a designated beneficiary.208 With 
knowledge that the celebrity entrusted his or her future image in the hands of the 
individual or entity, the chosen beneficiary possesses an incentive to both preserve 
the celebrity’s image and reap any financial benefits the image produces.209 As 
evidenced by one of the primary purposes of the passage of SB 771, many 
charitable organizations are supported by exploitation of deceased celebrities’
rights of publicity.210 Under New York law, such organizations are unable to 
benefit from a celebrity’s goodwill and continue a celebrity’s charitable work.211
Since many celebrities have opted to leave their residuary estates to specified 
charities, it only seems fitting that the designated charities receive the benefits 
associated with use of the celebrity’s identity.212
The danger of unjust enrichment is also clearly present when a legislature 
refuses to enact a postmortem right of publicity.213 This moral-based argument 
reflects a basic societal belief that it is wrong for “free-riders” or “parasites” to 
misappropriate another individual’s hard work and dedication.214  It is argued that 
such act of free-riding, if unchecked, may have far-reaching negative effects for 
both celebrities and society at large, as it will likely discourage celebrities from 
contributing their images to the public domain.215 Under New York law, 
regardless of the investment a celebrity made to cultivate his or her image, upon 
the celebrity’s death, the public can use the image to its economic advantage.216 In 
essence, upon a celebrity’s death, advertisers, vendors, and the public at large 
receive a “windfall” by having the freedom to use a celebrity’s identity for 
commercial purposes—an illogical and unfair result.217 The arguments against a 
“windfall” effect are particularly strong given the fact that for many celebrities 
their popularity survives their death, resulting in substantial annual incomes.218
207 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
208 Mulrooney, supra note 38, at 1155.  The concept of descendibility assures that a celebrity’s 
right of publicity is “vested in a suitable beneficiary.”  Id.
209
Id.
210
See supra note 138.
211
See Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. CV 05-02200 MMM (MCx), 
2008 WL 655604, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008)
212 Mulrooney, supra note 38, at 1155.  It is believed that the ability to pass on a right of publicity 
has a “motivational effect” on the celebrity.  Id. Specifically, a celebrity may be more motivated to 
succeed in life if he or she knows that his or her fortunes will in turn provide for the financial security 
and prosperity of the celebrity’s designated beneficiaries.  Id.
213 Lieberstein, supra note 181, at 10 (arguing that legislation that recognizes a postmortem right of 
publicity rejects the principle of unjust enrichment).
214 Carpenter, supra note 36, para. 14.
215
Id.
216
See Mulrooney, supra note 38, at 1156.
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Id.
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Id.; see Hoy, supra note 1.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., the court 
upheld the postmortem right of publicity in California for a celebrity who had died 
before the state’s statute had been enacted.  However, as it was ultimately 
determined that the celebrity was domiciled in New York at the time of her death, 
her right of publicity was extinguished upon death.  The case highlights the need 
for the New York State Legislature to adopt a postmortem right of publicity statute 
similar to that enacted in California to avoid the risk of a celebrity’s domicile 
determining such a significant right.  Since many celebrities “live” in both 
California and New York, with the two states’ differing right of publicity 
statutes—with one clearly favoring celebrities—it is likely that such disparity will 
lead to forum-shopping by deceased celebrities’ estates in order to adequately 
protect the celebrity’s identity.  Moreover, given the many control and economic 
incentives associated with a postmortem right of publicity, it is evident that New 
York’s enactment of such right will greatly benefit all individuals involved.  Until 
such statute is implemented, it appears now that it is better—both financially and 
economically—for a celebrity to live and die in California.
